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FINAL EXI0~NATI ON 
Administrative Law and Procedure (L3l) 
Fall S~~ester 1972 
NOTE: Lim! t anS\'lers to three (3) single sn ace exam book pages. 
QUESTION 1: 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has t~e broad goal of restoring 
and maintaining environmental quality. The heart of the statute and the section 
\-7hich has been the source of almost all NEPA litigation is Section 102 which requires 
that "all agencies of the Federal Government shall . • • include in every recommen-
dation or report on • major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment, a detailed statement by the resnonsible official ..• f! on 
the environmental impact of the proposed action. 
In the landmark NEPA case, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Co~ission v. ArC, 
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971, the Circuit Court of f,pneals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit found that t!"le II..EC had breached a judicially enforcearle duty in 
that, Hhile the AEC regulations did require that a detailed environmental statement 
be prepared prior to the hearing conducted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
in its review of the proposed project, the regulations did not require the board 
to consider the detailed statement at the hearing. Instead the Co~mission believed 
that it could carry out its t\TEPA responsibilities entirely outside the hearing 
process. The court stated that the Commission's "crabbed interpretation!' of NEPA 
made "a mockery of the Act." If the detailed statement Here to serve any purpose, 
hearing boards could not he left free to ignore the contents of the statement and 
still satisfy the !lcongressional intent that environnental factors, as cOIDniled in 
the 'detailed statement' be considered through agency review processes." Thus, 
the Calvert Cliffs' holding (that a detailed statement must be submitted prior 
to any agency formal hearing on a proposed federal action that affects the en-
vironment.) meant the NEPA statement must be included in the formal hearing issues . 
Having so ruled the Court remanded the record to A.E.C. for hearings and decision 
on the N.E.P.A. statement and issues. 
In that posture of the matter one of the parties to the proceeding (Coalition 
for Safe Nuclear POvler and Living :" In A Finer Environment) filed a motion with 
A.E.C. requesting that A.E.C. suspend the license previously issued to the 
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co authorizing commencement of construction of the 
Calvert Cliffs nuclear electric generating plant. No hearing was requested. 
- 2 -
A.E.C. denied the motion and declined to issue an order suspending the con-
struction permit pending the hearings on the N.E.P.A. issues. 
A.E.C. regulations provided for hearing procedures for any party other 
than the licensee, who objected to a determination of the Commission on the 
question of suspension of a construction permit pending full N.E.P.A. review. 
These A.E.C. regulations also provided that the Commission could prescribe the 
time Hithin which the hea ring procedures should be competed . 
The Commission had set forth in its regulations promulgated pursuant to 
Calvert Cliffs v three factors to be considered and weighed in the determination 
of the question of suspension of a construction permit pending completion' 
of a full N.E.P.A. revie,v ; 
"2. In making the determination called for in paragraph 1 , the Commission 
will consider and balance the following factors : 
" (a) Tfuether it is likely that continued construction or operation during 
the prospective review period will give rise to a significant adverse impact 
on the environment ; the nature and extent of such impact ~ if any ; and whether 
redress of any such adverse environmental i mpact can reasonably be effected 
should modification , suspension or termination of the permit or license result 
from the ongoing NEPA environmental review. 
l1(b) ~fuether continued construction or operation during the prospective 
review period would foreclose subsequent adoption of alternatives in facility 
design or operation of the type that could result from the ongoing NEPA en-
vironmental review. 
"(C) The effect of delay in facility construction or operation upon the 
public interest. Of primary importance under this criterion are the power 
needs to be served by the facili~y ; the availability of alternative sources, 
if any, to meet those needs on a timely basis ; and delay costs to the licensee 
it 
and to consumers. 
Without availing themselves of this hearing procedure because of the delay 
involved, the Coalititions for Safe Nuclear Power sought an interlocutory in-
junction in the Federal Court stayl~g construction until the Court could hear 
and adjudicate their claims that AEC had not taken into account appropriate en-
vironmental concerns in refusing to suspend the construction permit . 
State the question (or questions) presented. How should the Court rule 
on the petition for an interlocutory injunction? 
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Question 2: 
The instant litigation was precipitated by a press release on November 10, 
1971, of the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority announcing an electric 
rate increase approximating 20%. Following this press release very informal 
and perfunctory town meeting type public hearings .were. .heldon .the.. several 
major islands beginning on November 16, 1971. On December 3, 1971, Governing 
Board of the Authority heard the report on the public hearings and voted to 
place the new rate schedule into effect. These proceeding substantially complied 
with the statute of the Virgin Islands Legislature which statute contained no 
provision for judiCial review. 
In the same day, December 3, 1971, an action for an injunction against 
the Authority was brought in the United States District Court of the Virgin 
I s lands by the Virgin'.Islands Hotel Association, Inc., a nonprofit corpora-
tion whose membership consists of most of the hotels located in the Virgin 
Islands. The Association was not a customer of the Authority. It conducted 
no business in the Virgin Islands and paid no taxes there. Its office was 
in New York. 
In its injunction suit the Association sought a decree enjoining the 
collection of power charges under the new rates for a period of ten months. 
During the ten month period, the Authority would be required, under the 
requested injunction decree, to conduct new hearings and make a new rate 
study in order to redetermine the propriety of its proposed rates. If the 
current increases were determined to be reasonable, they woUld be continued. 
If reductions were required in these rates, the consumers would be reimbursed 
or credited with the difference between the current rates and whatever rates 
were determined, to be computed from December 1, 1971. If it was determined 
that certain rates would require even a greater increase than was announced ·on 
November 10, 1971, then such rates become effective pursuant to the statu-
tory procedure for setting new rates. The Authovity filed a motion to dismiss 
the petitions for the injunction. 
lfuat should be the ground, or grounds, of the motion to dismiss? 
How should the Court rule on the motion to dismiss, and why? 
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Question 3: 
These consolidated petitions for review seek to set aside the revised 
schedule of fees of the Federal Communications Commission which became ef-
fective August 1, 1970. The petitioners are representatives of the broad-
casting and cable television industries and include several individuals 
and corporations which have interests in particular broadcast~ properties. 
~fuile the contentions of the several parties vary widely the petitioners 
collectively present a broad :challenge to the Commission's authority to 
promUlgate and make effective its rule instituting the broad revisions in 
its fee schedule, under the rule making procedures followed by FCC. 
These fees were imposed by FCC on all its commercial licensees for the 
purpose of recovering both the direct and indirect costs of regulating the 
broadcast industry. 
The concept of user charges was explicitly authorized by Congress in 
Title V of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952. The Federal 
Communications Commission adopted its first fee schedule in 1963 covering all 
areas of Commission regulation at the time. Report and Order , Fees, 34 F. C.C. 
811 (1963). That schedule was challenged before the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals , which affirmed the Commission's order, Aeronautical Radio, Inc. 
v. United States, 335 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1964) , cert . denied, 379 U.S. 966, 
85 S.Ct. 658 , 13 L.Ed.2d 559 (1965). Shortly thereafter the Commission an-
nounced a policy of keeping its fees schedule under continuing review. See 
Fees, 1 F.C . C.2d 1349 (1965). 
On February 18 , 1970, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making looking towards the broad revision of its fee schedule and invited the 
filing of written comments. Schedule of Fees, Docket No. 18802, 21 F.C.C.Zd 
502, 35 Fed.Reg. 3815 (1970). The Commission noted that Congress had urged 
that the activities of the Commission become more nearly self-sustaining and 
pro?osed a new schedule of fees which would generate estimated fees approxi-
mating the Commissionis budgetary request for fiscal year 1971. These fees 
included increases in those areas which were already subject to at least 
nominal fees and proposed new fees in areas where the Commission had only 
recently exercised jurisdiction to regulate community antenna television 
(CATV) and radio frequency equipment testing and approval. 
After receiving a large number of written comments from interested 
parties , the Commission adopted the revised schedule of Fees on July 1 , 1970. 
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The docu@ent was officially released on July 2.1970, Schedule of Fees , 23 FCC 
2d 880 , and was printed in the July 8, 1970 issue of the Federal Register, 
35 Fed. Res . 10988 . 
The ne,,, schedule was to be effective August:. ;1.,1970 on a11 grants made 
on or after that date. The Commission, however, excepted from the grant fees 
those applications filed prior to July 1,1970, the date of the adoption of 
the new schedule. The Commission levied an annual fee on CATV systems equal 
to $0.30 multiplied by the number of subscribers of the system. 
Thereafter a number of petitions for reconsideration were filed with 
the Commission concerning various aspects of its fee schedule. These petitions , 
i~6ofar, "as they are material to this case, were subsequently denied , 28 FCC2d 
139 (1971) All petitions for review of the Commission's fee schedule rulings , 
filed pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) in this and other Circuits, here trans-
ferred to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and consolidated in this 
case. 
Hhat question, or questions, are presented as to the rule making pro-
cedures followed by FCC in adopting this fee schedule rule. How should the 
Court rule on the petitions for revielv i.,ith respect to these rule making 
procedures. 
Question 4 : 
This class action was brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
42 U.S.C. ~ 1983 , on behalf of all recipients of public aid in Illinois who 
are members of a family unit of two or more which pays more than $90.00 per 
month residence rental but receives $90.00 or less per month as ' a shelter 
allowance from the Illinois and the Cook County, Illinois, Departments of 
Public Aid. Defendants are the respective directors of the departments and 
are charged by law with the enforcement of the Illinois Public Aid Code. 
Section 12-4.11 of the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 
23, §12-4.ll, deals with public assistance shelter allowances and provides, 
in relevant part: n[T]he shelter standard for any recipient, exclusive of house-
hold furnishings and utilities shall not exceed $90.00 per month, except for 
adjustments made in the manner authorized by § 12-14." Section 12-14, Ill. 
Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 23,§12-l4, provides that the Illinois Deparment" of Public 
Aid may, after consultation with the Legislative Advisory Committee on Public 
Aid, authorize "deviations" from the $90.00 perllIlonth limitation. 
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Plaintiffs filed their original complaint without requesting any ex-
ceptions as to them o.f the statutory $90.00 maximum, challenging only the 
constitutionality of these statutory provisions on their face. 
On November 12, 1968, a three judge court issued its/ opinion finding the 
statute constitutional on its face Metcalf v. Swank, 293 F.Supp.268 (N.D. Ill. 
1968). The court found that "the arbitrary nature of a flat maximum" was 
avoided in the statute by its provision for exceptions to the $90 . 00 maximum, 
and by the statutory provisions for administrative hearing procedures on 
requested exceptions to the $90.00 maximum, as well as the statutory pro-
visions for administrative appeals within the Public Aid Department. The 
court further const~ued the statute to require the granting of such exceptions 
whenever necessary to "provide a livelihood compatible with health and we1l-
being," as stated in section 12-4.11. Having reached this conclusion, the 
three judge court remanded the case to a single Federal Judge for resolution 
of any factual questions that might remain. 
Plaintiffs did not appeal the decision of the three judge court but 
rather filed an amended complaint before the single Federal district judge. 
Count I of the amended complaint renewed the challenge to the statute on 
its face. Count I was dismissed because previously decided by the three 
judge court. 
In Count II of the Amended Complaint the Plaintiffs undertook for the 
first time to challenge';: the application of the statutory $90.00 maximum to 
them. The defendants moved the district judge to strike Count II. 
What question, or questions, are presented by Count II of the Amended 
Complaint and the motion to strike? How should the district court judge rule 
on the motion to . !jtrik~, and why? 
Question 5: 
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) provide for suspension. 
of contractors, bidders or offerors without hearing, as follows: 
ASPR § 1. 605-1 
The Secretary or his authorized representative (see § 1.600(b» may, in the 
interest of the Government, suspend a firm or individual: 
(a) Suspected, upon adequate evidence, of-
(1) Commission of fraud or a criminal offense as an incident to obtaining , 
attempting to obtain, or in the performance of a public contract ; 
(2) Violation of the Federal antitrust statutes arising out of the sumis-
sion of bids and proposals; or 
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(3) Commission 6f embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or 
destruction of records, receiving stolen property, or any other offense 
indicating a lack of business integrity or business honesty, which 
seriously and directly affects the question of present responsibility 
as a Government contractor; or 
(b) For other cause of such serious and compelling nature, affecting re-
sponsibility as a Government contractor, as may be determined by 
the Secretary of the Department concerned to justify suspension. 
Suspension of a firm or individual by the Secretary or his authorized 
representative shall operate to suspend such firm or individual 
through tout the Department of Defense. 
ASPR § 1.605 provides in part: 
Suspension of a contractor, bidder or offeror is a drastic action 
which must be based upon adequate evidence rather than mere accusation. 
In assessing adequate evidence, consideration should be given to how 
much credible information is available, its reasonableness in vielv 
of surrounding circumstances, corroboration or lack thereof as to 
important allegations, and inferences which may be drawn from the 
existence or absence of affirmative facts. This assessment should 
include an examination of basic documents such as contracts, inspection 
reports, and correspondence. 
ASPR § 1.605-2 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Period of Suspension. All suspensions shall be for a temporary period 
pending the completion of investigation and such legal proceedings as 
may ensue. In the event prosecutive action is not initiated by the -
Department of Justice within 12 months from the date of the notice of 
suspension, the suspension shall be terminated unless an Assistant 
Attorney General requests continuance of the suspension. If such a 
request is received, the suspension may be continued for an additional 
six months. Notice of the proposed removal of the suspension shall 
be given to the Department of Justice 30 days prior to the expiration 
of the 12 month period. In no event will a suspension continue beyond 
18 months unless prosecutive action has been initiated within that 
period. tVhen prosecutive action is initiated, the suspension may 
continue until the legal proceedings are completed. Upon removal of 
a suspension, consideration may be given to debarment~ in accordance 
with § 1. 604. 
Horne Brothers, Inc., was suspended under these regulations in December, 
1971, as a bidder on Department of Defense contracts. Soon thereafter Horne 
brought an action alleging that the Secretaries of Defense and Navy had acted 
in violation of law by iSSuing the suspension and by refusing to award to 
Horne a repair contract on the naval vessel U.S.S. Francis Harion. Horne's 
Gomplaint requested, among other things, that the Secretaries of Defense 
and Navy be enjoined from thus suspending Horne as a bidder, and that the Sec-
retaries be temporarily restrained from permitting any other bidder to pro-
ceed with the repair work on a contract ~1ard. The Secretaries filed a motion 
to dismiss the Complaint of Horne. 
What question, or questions, are presented by the Complaint and motion 
to dismiss? How should the Court rule on the motion to dismiss and on the 
requested temporary restraining order, and why? 
